Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 21 | Issue 2

Article 7

5-1-2007

Hudson v. Michigan: "Knock-and-Announce" — An
Outdated Rule?
J. Spencer Clark

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
Recommended Citation
J. Spencer Clark, Hudson v. Michigan: "Knock-and-Announce" — An Outdated Rule?, 21 BYU J. Pub. L. 433 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol21/iss2/7

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Hudson v. Michigan: “Knock-and-Announce”—An
Outdated Rule?
I. INTRODUCTION
The scene is a familiar one—gathering members of S.W.A.T. place
themselves around a home where a dangerous and villainous individual
hides. While inside waiting, the criminal loads his weapons, makes
threats to members of law enforcement, and in many situations, holds
hostages. What happens once law enforcement officers strategically
place themselves in the surrounding area is often tragic. Someone fires a
shot, the criminal fails to drop his weapon, a hostage is killed, or a host
of other events occur, leading to officers charging into the home to stop
the individual.
Citizens view this scenario almost nightly on prime time television
and weekly on the big screen, and occasionally as the topic of breaking
local news. The end result in these situations is often swift and decisive.
The point of this scenario is to get the law enforcement officers into the
criminal’s premises to take control of the situation and apprehend the
criminal. In situations where S.W.A.T is involved, it is more evident that
the governmental intrusion is necessary and critical. However, in less
severe situations, the need for governmental intrusion into the home is
less clear-cut; for example, entering unannounced into an individual’s
home in an attempt to discover incriminating evidence or to apprehend a
criminal. If law enforcement officials are not careful, these intrusions
into private homes, while inspiring a very heroic image of law
enforcement officers in the media, can neglect basic and fundamental
constitutional rights individuals enjoy against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This is exactly what happened in Hudson v. Michigan1 where
law enforcement officers made an unlawful entry into Booker T.
Hudson’s home to search for narcotics and guns.
This Note examines the “knock-and-announce” requirement, which
requires law enforcement officers to both knock and announce their entry
before entering an individual’s home. This examination takes place in
light of Hudson v. Michigan holding that evidence obtained in violation
of the “knock-and-announce” requirement is nonetheless admissible.
Additionally, this Note will examine the potential negative ramifications
1. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
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of the Court’s holding, including its sterilization of the “knock-andannounce” rule for excluding evidence. This Note concludes that where
Hudson strips the “knock-and-announce” of its Fourth Amendment bite,
it stands for more than not requiring evidence suppression, but also
sidesteps the applicability and future of the “knock-and-announce”
requirement.
Accordingly, section II of this Note deals with background of the
“knock-and-announce” rule, the reasons for the rule, and its application
to Fourth Amendment violations including for the suppression of
evidence. Section III examines the particular facts of Hudson v.
Michigan, including the methods the court uses in its analysis of the
issues. Section IV states the Court’s reasoning in Hudson including
policy arguments and reasons for the majority’s position. Section V
analyzes the Court’s holding and ultimate determination, identifying
weaknesses with the majority’s position and suggesting areas of
appropriate change. Finally, section VI concludes with a summary and
discussion of the benefits in adopting the approach articulated by the
dissent in Hudson.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects person and property from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 The Supreme Court has declared
that the “knock-and-announce” requirement forms part of the inquiry in
determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable.3 One reason for
requiring this standard is to protect the safety and security of individuals
from intrusion in their places of residence and other safe havens.4
However, the debate has raged on the appropriateness of such a
standard because law enforcement objectives are disadvantaged when
agents are required to “knock-and-announce” before entering.
Advantages of the “knock-and-announce” requirement are that it helps
people avoid compromising situations that can arise upon unannounced
entry, and it gives individuals the time necessary to gather themselves for
visitors.5 A disadvantage of the requirement is that it leads to inefficiency
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995)).
4. Id. at 2180.
5. Id. at 2165.
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because individuals are given time following a warning to hide
incriminating evidence from law enforcement officers.6 This can lead
both figuratively7 and literally to evidence being flushed down the toilet.8
Additionally, such opponents argue that by knocking and announcing,
law enforcement officers face dangerous situations by allowing criminals
the time to marshal firearms or other weapons.9
The Supreme Court has primarily dealt with these risks by granting
law enforcement a broad window of interpretation in the “knock-andannounce” rule. As part of this broad window, the Supreme Court, while
giving credence to the “knock-and-announce” standard, indicated
awareness of the very real threat of criminals turning on law enforcement
after law enforcement officers have knocked and announced by stating
that “a mere ‘reasonable suspicion’ that knocking and announcing ‘under
[certain] circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime,’ will cause the
requirement to yield.”10 Thus, in situations where there exists a
“reasonable suspicion” of danger or futility from knocking and
announcing, law enforcement officers can ignore the requirement and
enter.11
In addition to the myriad of cases involving “knock-and-announce”
violations, the legislative branch has foreseen and accounted for
circumstances where a “reasonable suspicion” may arise.12 The main
legislative solution is the issuance of the “no knock” warrant, which
allows for immediate entry.13 This demonstrates that both the judicial and
legislative branches have tried to accommodate law enforcement by
granting wider leeway to the strict obedience of the “knock-andannounce” requirement.
However, for those situations where the “knock and announce” rule
is applied, one controversy remains: the extent to which, if a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs, the exclusionary rule suppresses any
evidence or information found during the search and seizure from being
used in court.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2166.
Id.
United States v. Navedo, 443 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162-63.
Id. at 2166 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)).
Id. at 2163.
Id. at 2182.
Id.
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III. FACTS OF HUDSON V. MICHIGAN14
The Hudson decision gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to
further comment on the “knock–and-announce” requirement and its
ability to trigger the application of the exclusionary rule that suppresses
evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure.
The decision in Hudson arose after almost a decade of silence from
the Supreme Court on Fourth Amendment search and seizure inquiries.
In U.S. v. Ramirez, the most recent Supreme Court articulation of the
Fourth Amendment search and seizure inquiry, the Court stated that if
the manner of entry was unreasonable, implying illegality, then “it would
have been necessary to determine whether there had been a ‘sufficient
causal relationship between the [unlawful entry] and the discovery of the
guns to warrant suppression of the evidence.’”15 Since Ramirez, circuits
have been in disagreement on what the “sufficient causal relationship”
would be in relation to inevitable discovery.16 If there was a sufficient
causal relationship between the manner of entry and the inevitable
discovery, then courts generally excluded the evidence from use against
the individual. It was under this framework that Hudson occurred.
On the afternoon of August 27, 1998, approximately seven Detroit
police officers arrived at Booker T. Hudson’s home to execute a search
warrant for narcotics. There was no indication that anyone in the home
would destroy or attempt to destroy evidence, escape, or resist the
execution of the warrant.17 The import of this being that there was an
absence of the reasonable suspicion necessary to supersede the “knockand-announce” requirement. Upon arriving at the home, some of the
officers shouted, “Police, search warrant.”18 However, the officers did
not knock,19 and they waited only three to five seconds20 before opening
the door and entering. One officer characterized the wait as the amount
of time it took to open the door and describing the entry as “real fast.”21
Once law enforcement officers entered the home, they immediately
found Hudson seated in a chair where they ordered him to stay still.22

14. This Part is derived primarily from the direct examination of police officer Jamal Good.
Joint Appendix, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 2083644, at *17–20 [hereinafter
Joint Appendix].
15. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 (1998)).
16. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
17. Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at *15.
18. Id. at *19.
19. Id. at *8.
20. Id. at *15.
21. Id. at *19.
22. Id. at *6.
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While searching the home, the officers found five rocks of crack cocaine
in Hudson’s pants pocket. Hudson moved to suppress the evidence found
in his home on the ground that the police had violated the Fourth
Amendment and Michigan law by failing to knock-and-announce before
entering his home.23
The Michigan trial court granted a motion for suppressing the
evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation.24 However, “on
interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.”25 The
Michigan Supreme Court “denied leave to appeal,” and Hudson was
subsequently convicted of possession of drugs.26 After a renewed claim,
rejection by the Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court
declining review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.27 In its majority
opinion, the Supreme Court held that “a violation of [the “knock-andannounce” rule] is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of
evidence to justify suppression.”28
IV. REASONING
The Court began its reasoning by recognizing that the principle of
announcing one’s presence and providing residents with the opportunity
to open the door is ancient, with origins linked to our English legal
heritage.29 Additionally, the Court recognized that this rule “was also a
command of the Fourth Amendment.”30 However, the Court made a
point of mentioning that this standard has exceptions.
For example, exception may be found “[if] ‘circumstances presen[t]
a threat of physical violence,’ or if there is ‘reason to believe that
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice [of entry] were
given,’ or if knocking and announcing would be ‘futile.’”31 In these
situations the Court only requires that police “have a reasonable
suspicion . . . under the particular circumstances” that one of these
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule exists.32 The Court, however,

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
omitted).
32.
omitted).

Id. at *9.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2170.
Id. at 2162.
Id. at 2162–63 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)) (internal citations
Id. at 2163 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)) (internal quotes
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expressed that these issues were irrelevant to this inquiry because
Michigan conceded a “knock-and-announce” violation.33
A. Whether Suppression Is the Necessary Remedy
The Court, however, stated that the main issue of the case was
whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for “knock-and-announce”
violations; thus the majority set out to make this determination.34 The
Court stated that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been [the
court’s] last resort, not [the court’s] first impulse” because “[t]he
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs’” including the
occasional situation of “setting the guilty free and the dangerous at
large.”35
B. But-For Causation
The Court found that the illegal entry in this case was not the but-for
cause of obtaining evidence, and further found that even if it was, that
but-for causation is not enough to justify exclusion.36 The Court reasoned
that “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a
constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence,”
noting “that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient,
condition for suppression of evidence.”37 The court stated that in this
case the constitutional violation in the illegal manner of entry was not a
but-for cause of obtaining the evidence because whether the misstep of
ignoring the “knock-and-announce” rule had occurred or not, “the police
would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have
discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.”38 The Court further
reasoned that “even if the illegal entry [is] characterized as a but-for
cause of discovering [the evidence], . . . [the] evidence is [not] ‘fruit of
the poisonous tree.’”39 Rather the Court asks “whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.”40 Additionally, the Court sets forth an argument that under but-for
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
Id. at 2164.
Id. at 2164.
Id.
Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)).
Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)) (internal quotes
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causation, attenuation is generally too remote.41
C. Interests Protected by “Knock-and-Announce” Requirement
Furthermore, the Court identifies the interests protected under the
“knock-and-announce” rule as the protection of human life and limb,
property, and “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be
destroyed by a sudden entrance.”42 As the Court states, however, the
“knock-and-announce” rule has never protected an individual from the
government’s interest in seeing or taking evidence pursuant to a valid
warrant.43 The Court applies this reasoning to mean that a violation of the
“knock-and-announce” rule should not result in suppression of evidence.
Allowing for the suppression of evidence in situations where there is a
“knock-and-announce violation” is the equivalent of winning the lottery,
where the cost is small but the jackpot is enormous.44 For such a small
violation to result in the suppression of evidence would, in some cases,
be like issuing “get-out-of-jail-free card[s].”45
D. Reasonable Wait Time Under “Knock-and-Announce” Requirement
Additionally, for a violation under the knock-and-announce rule, the
Court reasons that a “reasonable wait time” in a particular case is
difficult for the trial court or appellate court to determine.46 The Court
extends this reasoning to the facts in Hudson’s situation of officers
yelling and then simply waiting as long as it takes to open the door.
Defining a “reasonable wait time” can be a matter of splitting hairs,
especially when determined on a case-by-case basis, and can have the
consequence of sending “incongruent” messages to law enforcement on
the appropriate wait time required under the Fourth Amendment. As
such, this could lead to the severe consequence where “officers [are]
inclined to wait longer than the law requires[, thereby] producing
preventable violence against officers” and in some cases destruction of
evidence.47

omitted).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 2165.
Id.
Id. at 2166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. Deterrence Benefits
The Court reasoned that it should not use extreme measures like
evidence suppression to ensure compliance with the “knock-andannounce” requirement because “the value of deterrence depends upon
the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.”48 The Court
applied this language to the case of Hudson and determined that the
value of deterring violations is low because of the potential dangers to
law enforcement officers from following the “knock-and-announce”
requirement. In fact, violating the “knock and announce” requirement
often leads to the discovery of more incriminating evidence than would
otherwise be available.49 From the standpoint of the Court, “ignoring
knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely
nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence and the
avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of the
premises . . . .”50 Because of such dangers, the Court dismisses the
“knock-and-announce” requirement where such circumstances give law
enforcement “reasonable suspicion.”51
F. Better Training Means Increased Awareness
The Court cites as another reason for not suppressing evidence “the
increasing professionalism of police forces, including . . . [the] emphasis
on internal police discipline [prevalent in police forces].”52 According to
the Court, these new disciplinary procedures by law enforcement indicate
the increasing awareness and ability of law enforcement officers to “take
the constitutional rights of citizens seriously.”53
In the end, the Court concluded that “the social costs of applying the
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable,”
and where the “incentive[s] to such violations [are] minimal to begin
with, and the extant deterrences against [violations] are substantial, . . .
[then] resort[ing] to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt
is unjustified.”54

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2168.
Id.
Id.
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G. Why Evidence Inclusion Is Appropriate: Supporting Case Law
In making its next argument, the Court turned to and relied on three
separate cases: Segura v. United States,55 New York v. Harris,56 and
United States v. Ramirez.57 The Court used these cases to illustrate why
evidence inclusion is appropriate though a “knock-and-announce”
violation has occurred.
1. Segura v. United States
Like Hudson, Segura also involved an illegal entry. In Segura, the
police waited for Segura outside an apartment building and upon his
arrival, Segura denied living there.58 The police then brought Segura up
to the apartment, an officer knocked, and when someone answered the
door, the police entered.59 In this case the officers had “neither a warrant
nor consent to enter, and they [failed to] announce themselves as police,”
a situation that the Court describes as “illegal as can be.”60 The police,
while still inside, were informed that a warrant had been obtained, and
the Court refused to exclude the resulting evidence.61 The court
recognized that “only the evidence gained from the particular violation
could be excluded” and therefore carved a distinction stating, “[n]one of
the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or
related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners’ apartment.”62The
Court drew the conclusion that treating Hudson differently would be
“bizarre,” especially where the officers gained entry in Segura without
the use of a warrant, and the officers in Hudson had a warrant prepared
for execution.63

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

468 U.S. 796 (1984).
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
523 U.S. 65 (1998).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2169.
Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)) (internal quotes omitted).
Id.
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2. New York v. Harris
In Harris, a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the police
arrested the defendant in his home without a warrant.64 The court refused
to exclude an incriminating statement the defendant gave once he was at
the police station.65 The Supreme Court in Hudson makes the comparison
that “[l]ike the illegal entry [for Hudson], the illegal entry in Harris
began a process that culminated in acquisition of the evidence sought to
be excluded,” and that while the statement provided was “the product of
an arrest and being in custody,” it is distinguished by not being the fruit
of the arrest being made at the house rather than someplace else.66 The
Court concludes the comparison by stating that “[w]hile acquisition of
the gun and drugs was the product of a search pursuant to warrant,”
albeit illegal because of the knock-and-announce violation, “it was not
the fruit of the fact that the entry was not preceded by [following the]
knock and announce [rule].”67
3. United States v. Ramirez
As its final example supporting the inclusion of the evidence
obtained by the illegal entry,68 the Court cites to United States v.
Ramirez.69 In Ramirez, the Court found that police violated the Fourth
Amendment by breaking a window to enter the premises.70 The Court
ultimately concluded that “the property destruction was . . . reasonable,”
but said that “destruction of property in the course of a search may
violate the Fourth Amendment, even [if] the entry itself is lawful and the
fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.”71 What was important
to the Court was determining whether the breaking of the window and
discovery of evidence had a “sufficient causal relationship.”72 The Court
applied the Ramirez reasoning when it determined that the few seconds
gained by not knocking and announcing, when compared with the
evidence later discovered, did not create such a sufficient causal

64. Id..
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990)) (emphasis added) (internal
quotes omitted).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 2170.
69. 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
70. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170.
71. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71.
72. Id. at 72 n.3.
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relationship to warrant excluding the evidence.73
H. The Hudson Holding and Its Implications
Based on the majority’s reasoning, the decision in Hudson
“determines only that in the specific context of the “knock-andannounce” requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later
discovery of evidence to justify suppression.”74 Tangential questions
follow on what the practical effect of the “knock-and-announce” rule is if
one can skirt the rule, but courts still hold any evidence obtained
admissible. The majority argues that in addition to protecting “human
life and limb,” the rule functions to prevent embarrassing defendants by
stopping law enforcement officers from entering and finding defendants
during compromising situations.75 Additionally, the Court argues that the
purpose of the requirement partially rests with providing protection for
law enforcement from dangerous and compromising situations where the
startled defendant may resort to violence by the surprise of the
intrusion.76
V. ANALYSIS
Rather than adopt the approach articulated by the majority for future
“knock-and-announce” jurisprudence, the dissent articulated the more
appropriate standard, and properly deals with “knock-and-announce”
violations. Led by Justice Breyer, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
argue that evidence exclusion is the appropriate remedy in “knock-andannounce” violations. The dissent discusses the context of the Fourth
Amendment “knock-and-announce requirement, including important
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue, and the protections afforded
by evidence exclusion under the “knock-and-announce” requirement.
According to the dissent, the majority’s use of the reasonable suspicion
requirement leads to a slippery slope resulting in the sterilization of the
“knock-and-announce” requirement. The dissent also looks at the
existing legislative and judicial protections law enforcement has been
granted.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2165.
Id.
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A. Previous Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. Wilson v. Arkansas: What does it stand for?
Prior to the decision in Hudson, one of the most recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with Fourth Amendment questions was Wilson v.
Arkansas.77 The result of Wilson was a victory for defendants’ rights,78 as
it held that the common law “knock-and-announce” principle formed a
part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.79 One author
described the result of Wilson as a decision that “should have an
immediate practical impact [on defendants’ rights] by forcing police
departments and law enforcement agencies at all levels to re-examine
their ‘no-knock’ and ‘dynamic entry’ search and seizure policies.”80
One of the unresolved issues of the Wilson decision was whether it
would uphold the Weeks exclusionary rule doctrine.81 The Court in
Hudson pointed out that “Wilson specifically declined to decide whether
the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-andannounce requirement.”82 However, one commentator posited that the
result of Wilson would “render the exclusionary rule ineffective.”83 The
result of Wilson was not an evaporation of the exclusionary rule, but a
declaration that the “knock-and-announce” requirement formed party of
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.84 Thus, while Wilson
remained silent surrounding the application of the exclusionary rule,
years of precedent held that evidence obtained through a “knock-andannounce” violation was inadmissible.85 In Weeks v. United States,86 the
Supreme Court initially held “that evidence obtained in violation of an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used against that
individual in a criminal prosecution.”87 The initial exclusionary rule was

77. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
78. Brent P. Reilly, Comment, Wilson v. Arkansas and the Knock and Announce Rule:
Giving Content to the Fourth Amendment, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 663, 666 (1997).
79. The Fourth Amendment protects people’s rights “to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As a result
of Wilson, the knock-and-announce rule helps determine what is reasonable, as is described in the
language “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. (emphasis added).
80. Reilly, supra note 78, at 666 (quoting Marcia Coyle, The Justices Close Ranks on ‘Knock
and Announce,’ NAT’L L.J., at A14 (June 5, 1995)) (internal quotes omitted).
81. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
82. Id.
83. Reilly, supra note 78, at 697.
84. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
85. See Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 643 (1961).
86. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
87. Reilly, supra note 78, at 670.
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limited in its reach as it applied only to “federal government and its
agencies”⎯meaning that evidence suppression was unnecessary and
inappropriate for government officials acting in an individual capacity.88
Not only was this a limit to its reach, but state courts also were not
required to follow the exclusionary rule.89
The Supreme Court, however, “broadened the applicability of the
exclusionary rule”90 in Mapp v. Ohio,91 where it held that “all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . .
inadmissible in a state court.”92 The Mapp holding “eliminated the
distinction in Weeks.”93
Therefore, while the Supreme Court evidence exclusion
jurisprudence was initially limited, its role was eventually expanded. Not
only did the Supreme Court give the exclusionary rule more expansive
power, but it solidified the importance of deterring law enforcement
officers from making unreasonable searches or seizures by excluding
evidence obtained on a “knock-and-announce” violation.
However, with the decision in Hudson, the court drastically sterilized
the power of evidence exclusion. The Court’s determination that the
purpose of “knock-and-announce” is its ability for individuals to
maintain dignity and gain composure limits the Court’s ability to exclude
evidence. Accordingly, some individuals find that what lies at the heart
of the requirement is individual dignity, or “the ability to prepare your
property and your mind for governmental intrusion of the most invasive
sort.”94 The opportunity to gather oneself before intrusion “arises [only]
when officers announce their presence and wait for the occupant of the
home to grant them entry.”95 Perhaps a problem with the rule is that the
public perception of the need to “knock-and-announce” is hampered by
the public’s desire to expedite the criminal process, meaning that the
public as a whole would rather see individual rights trampled so long as
it is not their own individually, and so long as the criminal is
apprehended.

88. Id. (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398) (internal quotes omitted).
89. Reilly, supra note 78, at 670.
90. Id.
91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
92. Reilly, supra note 69, at 670 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655) (internal quotes omitted).
93. Id.
94. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock-andAnnounce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79 (2005).
95. Id.
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B. Traditional Remedies Under the “Knock-and-Announce” Rule are
Inadequate
Although the “knock-and-announce” requirement mandates the
announcement prior to entry so as to provide protection for individuals,
when the requirement is not met, individuals are too often left without
recourse. Under a violation, any remedy the court imposes fails to
compensate for the privacy intrusion. “Although the ‘knock-andannounce’ rule provides important theoretical safeguards to the occupant
of a home, in practical terms, it is a largely unenforceable constitutional
right.”96 This has never been more evident than in Hudson. The majority
opinion assumes that rather than excluding evidence taken under an
illegal search or seizure, other remedies, including damages, provide
protection for the wronged individual. Martin Estrada notes that “[i]n the
criminal context, it is doubtful that evidence can be suppressed for a pure
‘knock and announce’ rule violation.”97 This statement acquires meaning
when coupled with the vast public perception and sentiment of
apprehending criminals at whatever cost, regardless of the individual
damages and wrongs inflicted upon them. Among such wrongs is the
taking of evidence obtained through an improper search of a dwelling
place. If courts no longer exclude evidence because of the Hudson
holding, then the only remedies left are civil. However, “[a]s for a civil
action, various legal hurdles and limitations make lodging a sustainable
claim for breach of the ‘knock and announce’ rule an arduous
proposition.”98
C. Reasonable Suspicion: Flourishing Judicial Remedy Or Withered
Exception?
With the announcement under Hudson that not all evidence obtained
through an illegal search must be excluded, the general requirement that
police officers “knock-and-announce” before entering takes a large if not
overwhelming hit. Such a hit occurs because without the “bite” that
evidence exclusion provides, law enforcement officers have little
incentive to conform to the “knock-and-announce” requirement. Both the
wronged individuals and the law enforcement officers involved have
countervailing interests that the judicial and legislative branches have
provided for. Law enforcement officers want the protection and safety of
not being thrust into harm’s way by being required to follow the “knock96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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and-announce” rule, whereas individuals want a guarantee against
intrusion from government officials without proper notification. The
Hudson interpretation of the “knock and announce” rule caters to law
enforcement’s needs while neglecting the needs of the individual. If the
purpose of the rule is to protect individuals, not law enforcement
officers, then the “knock-and-announce” requirement provides for an
appropriate remedy for wronged individuals.
Law enforcement officers already have protections that provide them
with greater safety and freedom to act. Officers in most state jurisdictions
have the ability to seek a no-knock warrant, to protect them from the
compromising situation of knocking and allowing the individuals inside
to muster either weapons or other articles that can prove dangerous to the
officers.99 In addition to this legislative remedy, the judiciary has given a
window of error to officers, under the doctrine of “reasonable suspicion”
which allows them to bypass knocking and announcing when
circumstances dictate it is either futile or will cause undue harm or
danger.100 Because of Hudson’s holding that not all evidence discovered
through a “knock-and-announce” violation needs to be excluded,
safeguards such as “reasonable suspicion” have the potential of
becoming dormant. By admitting evidence when the “knock-andannounce” rule is violated, both the legislative and judicial remedies
provided for safeguarding law enforcement are crippled.
With the decision in Hudson, the status quo guiding the “reasonable
suspicion” exception has evolved. Prior to the decision in Hudson, law
enforcement officers were required to knock and announce unless there
was a threat of physical violence, fear of evidence destruction, or if
complying with the “knock-and-announce” requirement would be
futile.101 These exceptions formed the “reasonable suspicion” governing
law enforcement officers “knock-and-announce” violations. However, to
the extent that Hudson has taken evidence exclusion off the table of
remedies available to wronged individuals, the further function of the
“reasonable suspicion” exception is uncertain. Whether or not the
“reasonable suspicion” exception has withered into dormancy will
depend on whether courts can redefine the scope of its applicability.
However, without further judicial pronouncement on the exception’s
applicability to “knock-and-announce” violations, the use of “reasonable
suspicion” grants law enforcement officers full-scale protection against
claims of unlawful entry. Hudson grants law enforcement officers
protection against evidence exclusion, and when the “reasonable
99. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2179 (2006).
100. Id. at 2182.
101. Id. at 2162-63.
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suspicion” exception is used it protects law enforcement from any further
liability from the unlawful entry. While an individual’s right to recover
from an unlawful entry is already slight, when law enforcement
buttresses the “reasonable suspicion” exception with the ability to admit
evidence obtained unlawfully, the result effectively seals off incentives
to comply with the “knock-and-announce” rule because law enforcement
officers can avoid liability under civil remedies as well as the threat of
evidence exclusion. Such a situation can lead to a severe handicap on
individual rights. Thus two possible long-term alternatives to the
“reasonable suspicion” exception include either redefining its scope and
applicability to consider the broad protections granted to law
enforcement in Hudson, or withering its usefulness into dormancy.
Additionally, the redefinition of the “reasonable suspicion” exception
should take into consideration factors such as whether the jurisdiction
offers “no knock” warrants, which further empowers a law enforcement
to side-step the “knock-and-announce” requirement. What is certain
regarding the “reasonable suspicion” exception is that the status quo has
changed, leaving an even stronger protection for law enforcement
officers.
Individuals, unlike law enforcement officers, do not have similar
protections. Prior to Hudson, the remedy available to individuals in most
cases was evidence exclusion, regardless of when law enforcement
seized the evidence.102 The doctrine of inevitable discovery further
defined this exclusion.103 However, the holding in Hudson limits
individuals’ rights upon improper searches and seizures.
Because of Hudson, officers can either completely disregard “knockand-announce” rules, knowing that there is no fear of evidence
suppression, or they can lump the action of entering without first
announcing into the reasonable suspicion classification, as a protection
against liability in situations where individuals attempt to enforce their
rights through civil remedies. What results is a two-pronged situation:
either ignoring the knock-and-announce rule and its reasonableness
inquiry because the incentive to comply has evaporated with the
majority’s holding, or lumping the unlawful entry into the breadth of the
reasonable suspicion exception.

102. Id. at 2173 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
103. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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D. Use and Understanding of “Inevitable Discovery”
The majority in Hudson used the doctrine of inevitable discovery in
the reasoning it relied upon to reach its holding that a violation of the
“knock-and-announce” rule does not warrant evidence suppression.104
This doctrine was expressed by Justice Kennedy, writing a concurring
opinion, when he stated that “[t]oday’s decision determines only that in
the specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement, a violation
is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify
suppression.”105 The doctrine of inevitable discovery creeps in when
discussing the causal relationship between the evidence discovered and
the inappropriate search and seizure. Justice Kennedy further stated that
“[civil] remedies apply to all violations, including, of course, exceptional
cases in which unannounced entries cause severe fright and
humiliation.”106 However, Justice Kennedy further stated that
“[s]uppression is another matter. Under our precedents the causal link
between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later
search is too attenuated to allow suppression.”107 Leading up to the
inevitable discovery doctrine, Justice Kennedy cites to United States v.
Ramirez108that states, “application of the exclusionary rule depends on
the existence of a ‘sufficient causal relationship’ between the unlawful
conduct and the discovery of evidence.”109 What troubled Justice
Kennedy, the deciding justice, was the causal link necessary to have
evidence exclusion. In fact, Justice Kennedy later states that “[i]n this
case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to
knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a
lawful warrant.”110
The majority deals with the doctrine of inevitable discovery through
discussing both ‘but-for’ causation and attenuation, to differing levels of
success. However, the writ for certiorari addressed the issue of inevitable
discovery. The writ states:
The issue that Wilson left open has divided the federal circuits and state
courts of last resort. The Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme
Court have held the inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 2173.
Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2170–71.
523 U.S. 65 (1998).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72).
Id.
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exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence found after a “knockand-announce” violation because the police presumably would have
found the same evidence if they had knocked and announced.111

The issue with the inevitable discovery doctrine is that “[b]y
contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and the courts of last resort in
Arkansas and Maryland have squarely rejected claims that the inevitable
discovery doctrine should insulate ‘knock-and-announce’ violations from
the exclusionary rule.”112 The misunderstanding of the inevitable
discovery doctrine announced in Nix v. Williams113 “would eviscerate not
only the ‘knock-and-announce’ but many other Fourth Amendment
doctrines as well.”114 Other approaches to the inevitable discovery rule
include that found in United States v. Langford115 a Seventh Circuit
decision that stated that “[t]he fruits of an unlawful search are not
excludible if it is clear that the police would have discovered those fruits
had they obeyed the law.”116
In United State v. Dice117 the Sixth Circuit gives a different
definition. There the court stated that “the inevitable discovery doctrine
properly applies only when the evidence would have inevitably been
found by means of an independent and untainted investigation.”118 The
inevitable discovery doctrine thus, “does not apply when the very same
officers who have violated the Fourth Amendment ‘knock-andannounce’ requirement simply barge into a home and discover the
evidence.”119
As stated by the Petitioners in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the
concern over the differing definitions of the inevitable discovery doctrine
is that “[t]he version of inevitable discovery followed by the Seventh
Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court would destroy any incentive the
police may have to comply with the ‘knock and announce’
requirement.”120 In fact, the argument went so far as to state:

111. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 856040,
at *7 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 937 (1995)) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]
112. Id.
113. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
114. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 111, at *8.
115. 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 895.
117. 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000).
118. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 111, at *8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce
violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift
move gut the constitution’s regulation of how officers execute such
warrants. . . . [T]he knock-and-announce rule “would be meaningless
since an officer could obviate illegal entry in every instance simply by
looking to the information used to obtain the warrant. [O]fficers, in
executing a valid search warrant, could break in doors of private homes
without sanction.”121

The same argument could “potentially be used to deny suppression
of evidence even when the police proceed without a warrant at all.”122 As
stated in the writ, in these cases, “police would only have to show that
they could have obtained a warrant and that they would have found the
same evidence if they had bothered to do so.”123
Based on the holding in Hudson, the inevitable discovery doctrine
allows law enforcement much greater power in both obtaining evidence
and also in using that evidence against individuals in criminal
proceedings.
E. Protective Mechanisms Provided by the Legislative and Judicial
Branches
The Supreme Court in Hudson stated that in the absence of evidence
exclusion protection, other mechanisms are available to compensate
individuals for improper searches and seizures. In Bivens v. Six Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,124 the Court stated that “the Fourth
Amendment does not specifically ‘provide for its enforcement by an
award of money damages for the consequences of its
violation.’”125However, the Court continued that “a monetary award of
damages is nonetheless appropriate in the absence of an “explicit
congressional declaration that . . . they may not recover damages.”126 It
was under this backdrop that individuals have become entitled to
personal redress for injuries in the event a Fourth Amendment
violation.127
What is difficult in the application of this rule, however, is the actual

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
Id..
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Reilly, supra note 78, at 672 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
Id.
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ability to recover. While Congress in 1979128 codified the right of an
individual to recover monetary damages from government officials who
violated the individual’s constitutional rights, there remains a limit on the
ability to recover. The Supreme Court “has limited the statutory right of
individuals to recover money damages under the [F]ederal Civil Action
for Deprivation of Rights Law.”129 As part of the law, a number of
officials performing discretionary functions receive qualified
immunity.130 Despite the Hudson majority’s assumption that damage
remedies are adequate, what appears to be the result is that in many
circumstances, damages are not available to the individual, or if they are,
officers have an affirmative defense that provides them with qualified
immunity thereby avoiding responsibility for the intrusion, improper
search and seizure.131
In essence, Hudson takes years of precedent of authority that gave
more expansive reach to the exclusionary rule, and severely bridles its
use in criminal proceedings. The entire deterrent effect that the
exclusionary rule seemed to have is crippled, if not entirely destroyed, by
allowing evidence to be used in proceedings after “knock-and-announce”
violations. While exigent circumstances are an issue when dealing with
the “knock-and-announce rule,” the court seems to handle them through
the reasonable suspicion exception available to law enforcement
officers.132 The problem that again surfaces, however, is that without a
deterrent effect, the “reasonable suspicion” exception either needs to be
redefined in its scope and applicability to accommodate the possible
change in its effect resulting from the Hudson holding. Alternatively, it
can have no effect at all if the consequence of violating the “knock-andannounce” rule evaporate. If the “knock-and-announce” rule has been
stripped of its Fourth Amendment bite, then perhaps Hudson stands for
more than not requiring evidence suppression; it also sidesteps the
applicability and undermines the future of the “knock-and-announce”
requirement.

128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other property proceeding for
redress.”).
129. Reilly, supra note 78, at 672.
130. Id. at 673.
131. Reilly, supra note 78, at 672-73.
132. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).

433] KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE – AN OUTDATED RULE?

453

VI. CONCLUSION: AFTERMATH OF HUDSON AND FUTURE OF KNOCKAND-ANNOUNCE
The majority opinion in Hudson has weakened the efficacy of the
“knock-and-announce” rule. Hudson was incorrectly decided because it
weakens an individual’s ability to enforce their Fourth Amendment
rights. This weakening has perpetuated several problems. First,
violating133 the “knock-and-announce” rule does not demand the
exclusion of evidence seized during the violation. However, evidence
exclusion is the only effective remedy for such violations contrary to the
majority’s assumption that other remedies are more effective in
providing a deterrent, including damages against officers. Second, the
limitation of the exclusionary rule weakens the deterrent effect of the
“knock-and-announce” rule, especially in light of the reasonable
suspicion exception. Officers now have the ability to expand the
umbrella of protection afforded by the “reasonable suspicion” exception.
Under the pre-Hudson doctrine, officers were not required to “knockand-announce” their presence if there was a reasonable suspicion of
danger or harm resulting from conforming to the requirement. Taken to
its logical conclusion, Hudson abolishes the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule. Officers are granted wide latitude to determine
whether danger or harm was present, thus sidestepping the “knock-andannounce” requirement without any punishment.
While the present state of the law does not require evidence
exclusion in “knock-and-announce” cases, the dissenting opinion
articulates the more realistic impact of the Hudson case. Justice Breyer,
leading the dissent, stated that “[t]oday’s opinion holds that evidence
seized from a home following a violation of [the knock-and-announce]
requirement need not be suppressed.”134 Justice Breyer continued by
stating that “[a]s a result [of today’s decision], the Court destroys the
strongest legal incentive to comply with the Constitution’s knock-andannounce requirement.”135 Additionally, “[i]t represents a significant
departure from the Court’s precedents. And it weakens, perhaps
destroy[ing], much of the practical value of the Constitution’s knockand-announce protection.”136 The “knock-and-announce” requirement
was effective because of its deterrent effect on law enforcement officers
133. This statement does not include situations where law enforcement officers have been
issued a “no-knock” warrant or where law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion of
danger exemplified in situations where the search is for guns (as was the case in Hudson before the
violation occurred).
134. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2171 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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from unreasonable searches and seizures. The requirement that officers
knock before entering was posited and analyzed in Wilson v. Arkansas137
where the court “trac[ed] the lineage of the [rule] back to the 13th
century,” and where the court wrote that “[a]n examination of the
common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the
reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether
law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to
entering.”138
The dissent argued for evidence exclusion. Relying on past
precedent, the dissent stated that “a court must ‘conside[r]’ whether
officers complied with the knock-and-announce requirement ‘in
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.’ The Fourth
Amendment insists that an unreasonable search or seizure is,
constitutionally speaking, an illegal search or seizure.”139 After Weeks
and Mapp, “‘the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure’ is ‘barred’ in criminal trials.”140
Next, the dissent declared that the “driving legal purpose underlying
the exclusionary rule, namely, the deterrence of unlawful government
behavior, argues strongly for suppression.”141 The result of the majority’s
decision was predicted by the dissent when they stated that “[w]ithout
[the exclusionary] rule . . . police know that they can ignore the
Constitution’s requirements without risking suppression of evidence
discovered after an unreasonable entry.”142 The dissent also said that
“some government officers will find it easier, or believe it less risky, to
proceed with what they consider a necessary search immediately and
without the requisite constitutional . . . compliance.”143
Of more importance to the dissent is what is likely to occur in the
future with Fourth Amendment questions. First, the “State or the Federal
government may provide alternative remedies for knock-and-announce
violations.”144 What is important though is that evidence exclusion is the
default remedy for improper searches based on “knock-and-announce”
violations. The dissent noted that the Court has declined to apply the
exclusionary rule in only two situations. First, “where there is a specific
reason to believe that application of the rule would ‘not result in
137. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
138. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2172 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931)
(internal quotations omitted).
139. Id. at 2173 (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934).
140. Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2174.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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appreciable deterrence,’” and second, “where admissibility in
proceedings other than criminal trials [is] at issue.”145 Neither exception
applied in Hudson here, and the dissent was unwilling to craft a third
exception that would undermine the usefulness of a “knock-andannounce” requirement.
Furthermore, the dissent points out the misapplication of the
“inevitable discovery” rule the majority relies on:146
That rule does not refer to discovery that would have taken place if the
police behavior in question had . . . been lawful. The doctrine does not
treat as critical what hypothetically could have happened had the police
acted lawfully in the first place. Rather, “independent” or “inevitable”
discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred
(1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful behavior and (2)
independently of that unlawful behavior. The government cannot . . .
avoid suppression of evidence seized without a warrant (or pursuant to
a defective warrant) simply by showing that it could have obtained a
valid warrant had it sought one. Instead, it must show that the same
evidence “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”147

The dissent was saying that “[t]he inevitable discovery exception
rests upon the principle that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary
rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered through a ‘later,
lawful seizure’ that is ‘genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted
one.’”148 The inevitable discovery doctrine applied by the majority is
inapplicable in this instance. There was no lawful second entry, and
though the officers held a valid warrant, they failed to execute it
properly. In the course of this failed execution, they performed an
unlawful search and seizure of the premises. Additionally, whether the
officers may have discovered the evidence independent of the unlawful
search is beside the point where the issued warrant was not a “no-knock”
warrant, which many states issue to assure police that prior
announcement is not necessary.149
Also, the dissent appears to more appropriately consider the policy
behind the adoption of a “knock-and-announce” requirement. The
majority “set[s] forth a policy-related variant of the causal connection” in
stating that “the law should suppress evidence only insofar as a Fourth
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 2175 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
Id. at 2178.
Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988)).
Id. at 2178.
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Amendment violation causes the kind of harm that the particular Fourth
Amendment rule seeks to protect against.”150 Under the majority opinion,
the “constitutional purpose of the knock-and-announce rule [was] to
prevent needless destruction of property . . . and to avoid unpleasant
surprise,” and thus exclusion of evidence should be limited to these types
of situations.151 The dissent however, points out that such an argument
“does not fully describe the constitutional values, purposes, and
objectives underlying the knock-and-announce requirement.”152 Rather,
the dissent adopts the language in Boyd, stating that “‘it is not the
breaking of [an individual’s] doors’ that is the ‘essence of the offense,’
but the ‘invasions on his part of the government . . . of the sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life.’”153Additionally, the dissent states
that “failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule renders the
related search unlawful. And where a search is unlawful, the law insists
upon suppression of the evidence consequently discovered, even if that
evidence or its possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons
underlying the unconstitutionality of a search.”154
Furthermore, the interest-based approach advanced by the majority
departs from prior law.155 Hudson serves to protect law enforcement
officers who are already protected sufficiently. The dissent states that
“[t]o argue that police efforts to assure compliance with the rule may
prove dangerous . . . is not to argue against evidence suppression. It is to
argue against the validity of the rule itself.”156 The dissent points out that
the proper answer in these situations is the granting of the “reasonable
suspicion” exception, and “no-knock” search warrants.157 In the absence
of either, the dissent points out, police “maintain the backup ‘authority to
exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock
entry at the time the warrant is being executed.’”158 Indeed, the dissent
points out that if the manner of entry is a matter of interest to the law
enforcement officers, the appropriate approach is to get a “no-knock”
warrant: “[i]f probable cause justified a search for guns, why would it not
also have justified a no-knock warrant, thereby diminishing any danger
to the officers?” The dissent argues that “[t]he very process of arguing
the merits of the violation would help to clarify the contours of the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 2179.
Id. at 2179–80.
Id. at 2180.
Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
Id. at 2181 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2182.
Id.
Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 n.7 (1997)).
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knock-and-announce rule,” rather than clouding them up as the majority
believes.159According to the dissent, the law in the future should be:
That procedural fact, along with no-knock warrants, back up authority
to enter without knocking regardless, and use of the “reasonable
suspicion” standard for doing so should resolve the government’s
problems with the knock-and-announce rule while reducing the
“uncertain[ty]” that the majority discusses to levels beneath that found
elsewhere in Fourth Amendment law.160

The long-term implications of the Hudson decision remain to be
seen, though over time courts will likely shift to the views posited by the
dissenting opinion. Despite the uncertainty arising from the decision in
Hudson, the “knock-and-announce” rule is still viable, although
significantly impaired. The rule thus continues to shape the duties of law
enforcement, adds contours to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry, and stands as a minor protection to citizens in the safety and
sanctity of their homes.
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